International Engagement
Federal Agency-Specific Research Security Activities, Policies, and Requirements
Federal agencies have undertaken a number of efforts to harmonize research security requirements, guidance, and forms. However, some noteworthy agency-specific requirements persist. See the sections below for more information.
Department of Defense (DoD)
The Department of Defense (DoD) released Countering Unwanted Foreign Influence in DoD funded Research at Institutions of Higher Education on June 30, 2023. The document includes:
- A Policy on Risk-based Security Reviews of Fundamental Research,
- An associated Decision Matrix to Inform Fundamental Research Proposal Mitigation,
- A list of foreign institutions identified by DoD as engaging in problematic activity, and
- A list of foreign talent recruitment programs identified by DoD as posing a threat to U.S. national security interests (Part 3, Tables 1 and 2).
The policy is part of the Department’s effort to counter unwanted foreign influence in, and misappropriation of, DoD-funded research to the detriment of national or economic security.
The Decision Matrix contains four factors for assessing senior/key personnel disclosures:
- Participation in foreign talent recruitment programs
- Current or prior funding from “foreign countries of concern” (FCOCs). FCOCs are currently defined as China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran per section 10612 of the CHIPS Act of 2022.
- Filing a patent in an FCOC or on behalf of an FCOC-connected entity, or in a non-FCOC country without disclosure, and
- Associations or affiliations with organizations on U.S. Entity (trade restriction) and other indicated lists.
The policy document and matrix serve as a guide to assist DoD program managers in reviewing fundamental research (that is, not classified or controlled unclassified) proposals selected for award for potential conflicts of interest and commitment using information disclosed by senior/key personnel. The policy and matrix were released publicly to provide researchers with a better understanding of factors of concern to the DoD with respect to international engagement. The policy provides central coordination and will eventually supersede existing matrices such as those of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and Army Research Lab. Per DoD, updates to the matrix will be made available on DOD’s Basic Research webpage.
1 National Security Presidential Memorandum-33 (NSPM-33) Implementation Guidance defines a Foreign Talent Recruitment Program as an “Effort organized, managed, or funded by a foreign government, or a foreign government instrumentality or entity, to recruit science and technology professionals or students.”
On February 14, 2024, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy released Guidelines for Federal Research Agencies Regarding Foreign Talent Recruitment Programs that addresses how a foreign talent recruitment program is and is not defined
Department of Energy (DoE)
The Department of Energy (DoE) has created an Office of Research Technology and Economic Security (RTES). In an October 2023 presentation, DoE representatives noted that much of the agency’s portfolio includes critical and emerging technologies. Examples included:
- Advanced batteries
- Advanced computing
- Advanced engineering materials
- Advanced manufacturing
- Artificial intelligence/machine learning
- Autonomous systems and robotics
- Biotechnologies
- Quantum information technologies
- Next generation renewable energy generation and storage
- Semiconductors and microelectronics
A slide on DoE’s “due diligence reviews” notes that, like DoD, risk reviews will be conducted on applications reviewed favorably for technical merit and, if awarded, any subsequent changes will likewise be reviewed. Representatives from RTES indicated that the agency wants to have greater consistency across the department, more transparency, and due process. They noted that different components of DoE have different risk thresholds and funding opportunity announcements may have different requirements depending on potential risk.
DOE released a financial assistance letter (FAL) outlining implementation of a research security training requirement. Per the FAL, covered individuals, those that contribute in a substantive way to the development or execution of the scope of work of a project, are required to take the training within the 12 months prior to proposal submission, although DOE can expand the scope of project personnel subject to training via the notice of funding opportunity (NOFO). The requirement is mandatory as of May 1, 2025, however, it may be applicable for earlier proposals with submissions dates indicated after May 1 in the NOFO. U-M will communicate details on implementation in February-March 2025. Per NSPM-33 final research security program requirements, all federal agencies will be requiring research security training.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Beginning in 2011, appropriations law (Section 1340 of Public Law 112-10) prohibits participation, collaboration, or coordination bilaterally with China or any Chinese-owned company on any NASA project at the prime or subrecipient level. In a September 2022 presentation (49:32 in the video), NASA clarified that the agency defines a ‘Chinese-owned company’ as any company owned by China, or any company incorporated under the laws of China, and that Chinese universities and similar institutions are considered to be incorporated under the laws of China and therefore the funding restrictions apply. Similar language is included as a footnote in section 2.16, Current and Pending Support, of NASA’s Proposer’s Guide. Per the footnote, “’China or Chinese-owned Company’ means the People’s Republic of China (PRC), any company owned by the PRC, or any company incorporated under the laws of the PRC. Chinese universities and other similar institutions are considered to be incorporated under the laws of the PRC and, therefore, the funding restrictions apply to grants and cooperative agreements that include bilateral participation, collaboration, or coordination with Chinese universities.”
National Institutes of Health (NIH)
NIH requires prior approval for a “foreign component,” defined as “performance of any significant element or segment of the project outside the United States either by the recipient or by a researcher employed by a foreign organization, whether or not grant funds are expended.” This definition and examples of activities that would meet, or that may be deemed significant under, this definition can be found here.
If you believe your project involves a foreign component, answer “yes” to question 5.13 on the proposal approval form (PAF) in eResearch Proposal Management (eRPM). Additional information can be found on the Office of Research and Sponsored Projects (ORSP) website here. If a proposed change to your project would create a “foreign component” after the project is underway, prior approval for the foreign component can be sought by submitting an award change request (ACR) to ORSP in the eRPM system. Allow several weeks for agency approval.
On August 15, 2024, NIH released a decision matrix to assist agency staff in assessing grant applications and ongoing awards for potential foreign interference, in particular, non-disclosure. Factors considered include: (1) participation in a malign foreign talent recruitment program, which is now prohibited by law, (2) undisclosed current or prior funding from a foreign country of concern (FCOC, or connected entity, – currently China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran – higher risk) or other foreign country (lower risk) and, (3) Indicators of an undisclosed current or past affiliation with an institution or entity located in or connected to a FCOC (higher-risk/mitigation) or foreign country (lower-risk/mitigation). Per the matrix, mitigation is either required, recommended, suggested, or not required based on the timing of the engagement (active/current vs. within the past 5 years) and if accurate and complete disclosure information was provided. In circumstances where mitigation is required, some conditions that could be implemented include: (1) specific award conditions, (2) modification of terms and conditions of award, (3) suspension, termination, or withdrawal of an award, (4) conversion from advance payment to reimbursement, and (5) recovery of funds.
In a blog post announcing the matrix, Mike Lauer, Deputy Director for Extramural Research, notes that NIH “strongly supports properly conducted and principled international collaborations that are integral for our country to remain competitive.” Regarding the potential for discrimination, the post indicates that NIH “will continue to ensure that these compliance reviews do not stigmatize or unfairly treat members of the research community, including members of ethnic or racial minority groups, or discriminate with respect to national origin or identity.” The post highlights a statement released by the NIH Director, NIH supports our valued Asian American, Asian immigrant and Asian research colleagues, indicating that “with these actions, I hope to ensure that NIH-funded institutions cultivate a welcoming and supportive environment for Asian researchers, as well as researchers from all other backgrounds.”
Post-Award Disclosure
NIH requires immediate notification of undisclosed Other Support as indicated on the NIH Other Support webpage and in NOT-OD-21-073. If a recipient discovers Other Support information on an active NIH grant that should have been, but was not, disclosed during just-in-time or in an annual progress report, updated Other Support must be submitted to the Grants Management Specialist as soon as the undisclosed information is known. If you become aware of Other Support information that should have been disclosed to NIH but was not, contact the U-M Other Support team at [email protected] for additional guidance.
National Science Foundation (NSF)
Post-Award Disclosure
NSF released updated guidelines on research security analytics in February 2023 regarding advanced monitoring and verification activities of NSF proposals and awards. The guidelines largely serve to provide transparency and identify guardrails NSF has put in place around the use of data analytics to monitor and validate information disclosed (e.g., in biosketches and current and pending support). For example, the activities are not investigative and cannot be incorporated into the merit review process. Sources of information include SCOPUS, Web of Science, and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Patent Database.
NSF Mandated Use of SciENcv for Biosketches and Current and Pending Support
Post-Award Disclosure
NSF requires post-award notification if an organization discovers that a PI or co-PI on an active award failed to disclose current support or in-kind contributions as part of the proposal submission process. The undisclosed information must be submitted by an ORSP representative within 30 calendar days of identification.
NSF Risk Assessment Rubric
In a May 23, 2024, presentation at the Federal Demonstration Partnership meeting, an NSF representative reviewed the New NSF Proposal Review Process: Trusted Research Using Safeguards and Transparency (TRUST). This is a proposal risk review process similar to that of DoD and DoE but with some notable differences. NSF’s process will focus on critical technologies, beginning with a pilot of quantum, proposals in FY25, expanding to other key technologies in phase 2, and scaling up for all key technologies identified in the CHIPS and Science Act in phase 3.
NSF will evaluate Three Criteria: 1. Appointments and positions with U.S. proscribed parties (e.g., U.S. BIS Entity List) and currently party to a malign foreign government talent recruitment program (MFTRP); 2. Non-disclosures of appointments, activities, and financial support; and 3. Potential foreseeable national security applications of the research. NSF will consider only current foreign appointments and affiliations and is not considering co-authorship in risk assessment.
A report from the JASON advisory group commissioned by NSF to inform the review process, Safeguarding the Research Enterprise was published on March 21, 2024 and helped guide the agency.